De-objectifying Animals: could they qualify as victims before the International Criminal Court? by Lostal, Marina
De-objectifying Animals




The legal framework of the International Criminal Court does not contain any pro-
vision concerning animals. This stands in contrast with the frequency with which
they appear in both trial and reparations proceedings. The silence of the legal frame-
work is problematic insofar as the ‘animal turn movement’, which questions the
classical understanding and treatment of animals as objects, has permeated into both
the international and domestic legal spheres. This article wishes to initiate a discus-
sion on the treatment of animals before the Court by examining whether they could
qualify as victims under Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. While
the short answer to this question is an unequivocal ‘no’, the conclusion reached is
not the purpose of the analysis. The analysis shows that animals cannot qualify as
‘victims’ because they are not human beings. Yet, they comfortably meet the other
two criteria, namely, (a) suffering harm, which (b) results from the commission of
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, this article argues that — at least —
granting animals the same treatment as human beings is no more objectionable as a
matter of legal principle than granting them the status of ‘things’. This calls for a
prompt discussion of the regulation of animals within the Court.
1. Introduction
The short answer to the question posed by this article — whether animals can
qualify as victims before the International Criminal Court (ICC or Court) — is a
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resounding ‘no’. The conclusion, however, is not the purpose of this analysis.
Animals cannot qualify as victims under the lex lata because they are not
human beings. Yet, they comfortably meet the other two criteria for victim
status, namely, suffering harm as a result of the commission of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court. Even though the adscription of rights to humans
based purely on their species membership may be regarded as ‘speciesism’, this
article is not meant as a piece of animal rights advocacy. The more sobering
legal point that this article wants to raise is that, while animals are certainly
not human beings, they are not objects either. However, it seems that the
Court has to act as if they were.
In recent years, the way animals are treated has become a matter of public
morality with legal implications.1 In contrast, the ICC legal framework con-
tinues to reduce animals to things, thereby concealing their particular vulner-
ability to core crimes and rendering their suffering invisible and legally
irrelevant. This is a problem not least because of the Court’s truth-telling
function and role in counteracting those atrocities that deeply shock the con-
science of humanity.
Ultimately, this article is another building block in the quest to establish an
intermediate legal category standing between things and persons for non-
human animals. It does so by teasing out the potential legal status of animals
within the Court. Section 2 shows the extent to which animals figure in ICC
proceedings and explains why the legal framework’s silence on their treatment
is problematic. Section 3 describes the key implications of being labelled a
victim. Section 4 examines whether animals could qualify as ‘natural persons’
in the sense of Rule 85(a) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).
Section 5 analyses what harm animals may suffer in connection to the crimes
under the jurisdiction of the Court; and, in Section 6, whether they would do
so with the requisite causal link. Section 7 considers extrinsic impediments to
the recognition of animals as victims.
2. The Status quo of Animals before the Court: Problems
and Horizons
The Rome legal framework does not contain any provisions concerning ani-
mals. To date, they have been treated as mere objects following the entrenched
binary conception that divides the legal world: persons and objects. In that
world, only the former are bearers of rights and entitlements. The legal frame-
work’s silence contrasts sharply with the frequency with which animals figure
in cases: they have sometimes appeared as objects affected in the course of
crimes (e.g. pillage) and, most prominently, they have played a part in every
1 See e.g. WTO, European Communities — Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing
of Seal Products, Panel Report, WTO Docs WT/DS400/R and WT/DS401/R, 25 November
2013 (EC — Seal Products) (‘WTO Seal Products Panel Report’), § 7420.







qab039/6356124 by guest on 01 Septem
ber 2021
single reparations proceeding, even when the criminal conduct at hand had
nothing to do with them.
For example, in the Lubanga case, which otherwise did not bear any con-
nection with animals, one proposed measure included animal husbandry of
‘goats, chickens or pigs’.2 With respect to female child soldiers, the legal rep-
resentative of victims (LRV) requested that rehabilitation measures take into
account: ‘[T]he property that the girls’ parents could have received as a bride
price when the girls were married. In their culture and customs, when a
young girl gets married, her bride price includes animals that are intended
to be bred in order to establish a supply of livestock from which the family can
draw to marry their sons.’3
The reason why animals have become a recurring theme in reparations is
because the specific remedies chosen for each case need to be meaningful to
the victims, that is, they need to carry actual reparative value for them. Many
situations before the ICC are located in areas such as the Sahel or West Africa
where animals are a key part of the cultural and economic context, as
expressed by an LRV: ‘Cattle plays an important role in the family and societal
relations of the victims . . .: animals allow to provide for the family, . . . a dowry
at a wedding, and to guarantee an inheritance for one’s children. [Owning
animals] represents an important form of social status.’4
Animals have featured more prominently in the Katanga case. The trial centred
on an attack in the town of Bogoro (DRC) targeted against the Hema ethnic
group. The ascribed trait of the Hema group as ‘herders by tradition’5 was a
motivating factor for Mr Katanga’s actions. In his own words: ‘[T]he Hema . . .
are graziers. They are herders. So, as regards them . . . it was said that we would
be driven from our land for it to become pasture for the animals. So, that was it.’6
An important part of the attack against the town of Bogoro, therefore, involved
pillaging animals belonging to the Hema. Mr Katanga was convicted for the war
2 Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims Submitted to the Amended
Reparations Order of 3 March 2015 in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Lubanga
(ICC-01/04-01/06-3177-AnxA), Trust Fund for Victims, 3 November 2015, § 161.
3 Observations of Team V02 on the draft implementation plan for reparations submitted by the
Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) to Trial Chamber II on 3 November 2015, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-3195-tENG), Legal Representatives of Victims, 1 February 2016, § 23(b). Similar rea-
soning was briefly acknowledged by Trial Chamber VI: see e.g. Reparations Order, Ntaganda
(ICC-01/04-02/06-2659), Trial Chamber VI, 8 March 2021, § 237 (recalling the submission by
the Appointed Experts that, in the context of ‘customary justice in the DRC, . . . in Ituri, most
rural victims are familiar with a system of compensation quantified by a specific number of
cows, with loss of life being negotiated with a minimum of ten cows and the burning down of a
house or another property typically starting with six cows’).
4 Propositions des victimes sur des modalités de réparation dans la présente affaire (Article 75 du
Statut et norme 38-1-f du Règlement de la Cour), Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3720), Legal
Representatives of Victims, 8 December 2016, § 19 (own translation from French).
5 Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-
tENG-Corr), Trial Chamber II, 23 May 2014, § 724.
6 Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG), Trial
Chamber II, 7 March 2014, § 712.
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crime of pillage, sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment7 and his liability for
reparations to the victims set at 1 million USD.8 In arriving at this sum, the
Trial Chamber took into account the market value of cattle eliminated and
ordered, inter alia, support for new income-generating activities for the affected
community.9 These activities were proposed to include vocational training for
animal husbandry, provision of small livestock and veterinary kits.10 The use of
animals did not end there. Since cows are a totemic figure in the Hema culture,
the LRV said that those individuals who had suffered the loss of a close relative
should receive ‘one cow with 4 teeth and a corresponding veterinary kit’.11 As a
result, in Katanga, animals figured at three different levels: as objects of the attack,
as heads for calculation of damage, and as a suggested means voluntarily brought
forward by the Court to redress the harm suffered by human victims.
In the Al Mahdi case, which revolved exclusively around attacks against
historic buildings and places of worship in the world heritage town of
Timbuktu (Mali), an early draft implementation plan of reparations proposed
a ceremonial sacrifice of ten bulls in order to restore the sacred nature to the
destroyed religious buildings, to then distribute the sacrificial meat among the
poor.12 This initiative was later abandoned in an updated plan for reparations
which is currently being implemented. The updated plan includes the setting
up of an economic resilience facility to overcome the harm caused by the loss
of pilgrimage and tourism. Part of this economic resilience facility — funded
with 1 million EUR — foresees small trade with livestock as well as the farm-
ing of cattle and fish.13 Just as with Lubanga, animals are a part of the repar-
ations programme even though the charges and ensuing conviction against Mr
Al Mahdi did not concern them at all.
That animals have entered and remained in the realm of international criminal
justice qua objects and without qualification is problematic. This is because the
‘animal turn movement’, which questions the classical understanding and treat-
ment of animals as objects,14 has permeated into both the international and
domestic legal spheres, both of which may be relevant to the ICC by reason of
7 Ibid., §§ 950, 957.
8 Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-
tENG), Trial Chamber II, 24 March 2017 (‘Katanga Reparations Order’), § 118.
9 Ibid., §§ 218, 300, 306.
10 Public Redacted Document, Draft implementation plan relevant to Trial Chamber II’s order for
reparations of 24 March 2017 ICC-01/04-01/07-3728, Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07-3751-Red),
Trust Fund for Victims, 25 July 2017 (‘Katanga Draft Implementation Plan’), § 128.
11 Ibid., § 96. The number of teeth in cattle is used to determine the age of animals.
12 Public redacted version of ‘Corrected version of Draft Implementation Plan for Reparations,
With public redacted Annex I, . . .’, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-265-Corr-Red), Trust Fund
for Victims, 18 May 2018 (‘Al Mahdi Draft Implementation Plan’), § 267. This initiative was
later abandoned in an updated version of the plan.
13 Lesser public redacted version of ‘Updated Implementation Plan’ submitted on 2 November
2018 . . ., Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-291-Red3), Trust Fund for Victims, 14 October 2019
(‘Al Mahdi Updated Implementation Plan’), § 127; approved by Decision on the Updated
Implementation Plan from the Trust Fund for Victims, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-324-Red),
Trial Chamber VIII, 4 March 2019 (‘Al Mahdi UIP Decision’), § 84.
14 H. Ritvo, ‘On the Animal Turn’, 136 Daedalus (2007) 118–122, at 121.
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Article 21(2) and/or (3) of the Rome Statute. There is now an increasing mass of
international and domestic rules which no longer considers animals as objects
and, instead, affords them some degree of special consideration. For example, a
World Trade Organisation (WTO) Panel affirmed in 2014 that ‘animal welfare is a
globally recognized issue’.15 Animal sentience is acknowledged by the European
Union in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) — whose
members are all parties to the Court (and constitute approximately a fifth of all
ICC States Parties). Thus, EU members are required to take animal sentience into
account when formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries,
transport, internal market, research and technological development, and space
policies.16 The World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) has issued several
international standards on animal welfare which address, for example, animal
transport and their slaughter.17 Courts in Argentina and Pakistan have recognized
legal rights of animals.18 In their civil codes, a number of States now proclaim
that animals are not things but sentient beings19 and afford them, for instance,
‘legal requirements and rules of common law, reasonable restrictions, obligations
and principles of law, as well as public order and morality’.20 In 2018, strategic
litigation against arbitrary confinement of animals in the USA led to a judicial
opinion which referred to the binary division between persons and things as ‘a
deep dilemma of ethics and policy that demands our attention’.21
In light of the principle iura novit curia, according to which the Court knows the
law, the systemic silence on the treatment of animals in the ICC legal framework
should be revisited. At a minimum, this should warrant a prise de conscience that
the categorization of animals as mere ‘things’ which can be used and abused no
longer constitutes the legal status quo worldwide.22 Preferably, it should lead to a
discussion of the place and treatment that animals ought to be afforded in the
framework of the ICC. This article wishes to initiate that stocktaking and discus-
sion by examining whether animals can qualify as victims themselves, under Rule
85(a), and drawing some tentative conclusions as to how their interests could
they be accommodated if they were.
15 WTO Seal Products Panel Report, supra note 1, § 7420.
16 Art. 13, Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December
2007, 2008/C 115/01 (‘TFEU’).
17 World Organisation for Animal Health, Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Section 7, Chapters 1–14.
18 Poder Judicial de Mendoza — Tercer Juzgado de Garantı́as, ‘Presentación efectuada por A.F.A.D.A.
respecto del chimpancé ‘Cecilia’ — Sujeto no humano’ (3 November 2016) Expediente n P-
72.254/15 (‘Cecilia Case’); Islamabad High Court, Islamabad Wildlife Management Board through
its Chairman v. Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad through its Mayor & 4 others (25 April 2020)
W.P. No.1155/2019 (‘Islamabad Wildlife Management Board Case’).
19 See e.g. Austria: Art. 285, Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code); Germany: Art. 90,
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code); Switzerland: Art. 641a, Civil Code; France: Art. 515-14,
Civil Code; Netherlands: Art. 2a, Section 1, Title 1, Book 3, Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code);
Czechia: Section 494, Civil Code; Catalunya (Spain): Art. 511–1(3), Civil Code.
20 Netherlands: Art. 2a, Section 1, Title 1, Book 3, Burgerlijk Wetboek (Civil Code).
21 New York Court of Appeals, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., on Behalf of Tommy, v. Patrick C. Lavery,
& c., et al., Judicial opinion of Judge J. Fahey in the Motion No. 2018-268, 8 May 2018, at 5.
22 S. Brels, Le droit de bien-être animal dans le monde: évolution et universalisation (L’Harmattan,
2017), at 13.
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It is important to note that this analysis does not look into the further
question whether animals could instead fit into Rule 85(b) RPE (concerning
victim status of institutions and organizations, i.e. legal persons).23 This is
because the requirements to qualify as victims under this provision are rather
different, and would need an entirely different legal analysis — which is a
subject for future exploration.
3. The Relevance of Qualifying as a Victim
The Court operates under a general principle according to which ‘[a] Chamber in
making any direction or order, and other organs of the Court in performing their
functions . . . shall take into account the needs of all victims and witnesses’.24 Yet,
the concept of ‘victim’ is only defined in Rule 85 RPE, according to which:
a. ‘Victims’ means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of
the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
b. Victims may include organizations or institutions that have sustained
direct harm to any of their property which is dedicated to religion, edu-
cation, art or science or charitable purposes, and to their historic monu-
ments, hospitals and other places and objects for humanitarian purposes.
Being considered a victim in the sense of Rule 85 RPE has far-reaching
implications, three of which are recalled here.
First, victims can influence the conduct of proceedings and the truth-telling
function of the trial. This is because their entitlement to participate in proceed-
ings, foreseen in Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute, implies that their legal
representatives will be allowed to: make opening and closing statements; ob-
tain access to evidence;25 question witnesses, experts and the accused;26 chal-
lenge or lead evidence;27 and make submissions on sentencing.28 Admitting
animals as victims would thus offer a means by which their suffering and, if
23 Using the term ‘legal person’, see Katanga Reparations Order, supra note 8, § 36.
24 See Rule 86 ICC RPE.
25 See C. Walter, ‘Victims’ Rights and Obligations as Regards the Case File: Access, Disclosure and
Filing Submissions’, in K. Tibori-Szabó and M. Hirst (eds), Victim Participation in International
Criminal Justice (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2017) 148–171, at 149–152. See also e.g. Decision on
victims’ participation in trial proceedings, Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-449), Trial Chamber VI,
6 February 2015, §§ 55–56; PRV on Decision on Victim Participation at Trial and on Common
Legal Representation of Victims, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-97-Red), Trial Chamber VIII, 8
June 2016, §§ 42–43.
26 Rule 91(3)(a) ICC RPE. See P. Haynes, ‘Victims’ Lawyers in the Courtroom: Opening and
Closing Statements, Questioning Witnesses, Challenging and Presenting Evidence’, in Tibori-
Szábo and Hirst, supra note 25, 243–281, at 247.
27 Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I’s Decision
on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-1432 OA9 OA10),
Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, § 101; Decision on Victims’ Participation, Lubanga (ICC-01/
04-01/06-1119), Trial Chamber I, 18 January 2008, § 108.
28 On this practice, see Haynes, supra note 26, at 277.
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appropriate, the impact on their habitat would become part of the case’s
narrative.
Second, the number of victims and the extent of harm they suffered is one of
the factors that trial chambers will take into account to determine the scope of
the convicted person’s liability for reparations,29 and having a new body of
victims admitted through Rule 85(a) RPE would only increase this final
determination.
Finally, who is considered the direct victim of a crime would also influence
who can qualify as an indirect victim and, in this way also, affect the overall
scope of victimization. The Appeals Chamber has explained that natural per-
sons in the sense of Rule 85(a) RPE includes: ‘direct’ victims, that is, those
whose harm results from the commission of the crime; and ‘indirect’ victims,30
who suffered harm as a result of that endured by the direct victims, such as
family members or those who suffered harm helping or intervening on behalf
of victims to try and prevent the commission of the crime.31 According to the
ICC, the concept of family ‘may have many cultural variations, and the Court
ought to have regard to the applicable social and familial structures’.32 While
this cosmopolitan view was meant to encompass the non-nuclear notion of
family predominant in Africa, today it may be no less applicable to considering
companion animals as family members.33
If animals were accepted within the remit of Rule 85(a), this would imply
that they could be considered indirect victims for harm occasioned to their
human owners and vice versa. The category of indirect victims of ‘those who
suffered harm helping or intervening on behalf of victims’ would also encom-
pass wildlife workers, anti-poaching personnel, and persons who engage in
disaster relief operations. In other words, admitting animals into the definition
of victims would not only benefit animals per se, but also extend the scope of
eligible human victims.
Therefore, accepting animals as victims would profoundly affect the narra-
tive of cases, the work of the Court — particularly the four sections dedicated
29 See M. Brodney and M. Regué, ‘Five Procedural Takeaways from the ICC’s 18 July 2019
Lubanga Second Reparations Judgment’, EJIL: Talk!, 13 September 2019, available online at
https://www.ejiltalk.org/five-procedural-takeways-from-the-iccs-18-july-2019-lubanga-second-
reparations-judgment/ (visited 9 March 2021).
30 Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be
applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012 with Amended Order for Reparations (Annex A),
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06-3129 A A2 A3), Appeals Chamber (‘Lubanga First Appeal Judgment
on Reparations’), Annex A (ICC-01/04-01/06-3129-AnxA A A2 A3) (‘Lubanga Reparations
Principles’), § 6.
31 Ibid., § 7.
32 Ibid.
33 See e.g. C.P. Kindregan, Jr., ‘Pets in Divorce: Family Conflict over Animal Custody’, 26 American
Journal of Family Law (2013) 227–232, at 227, J. Burchette, ‘The 10 Biggest Inheritances Ever
Left to Pets’, Everplans, available online at https://www.everplans.com/articles/the-10-biggest-
inheritances-ever-left-to-pets (visited 9 March 2021); M. Specia and G. Pianigiani, ‘Paid Leave
When Your Dog Is Sick? Sı̀, Italian Employer Says’, The New York Times, 12 October 2017,
available online at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/world/europe/italy-paid-dog-care-
leave.html (visited 9 March 2021).
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to victims34 — the notion and scope of justice pursued by the ICC and, pos-
sibly, the perception of the Court’s work outside its walls.
4. The First Requirement: Are Animals Natural Persons?
A. What is a Natural Person?
The condition for victimhood at the ICC that is bound to meet most resistance
when applied to animals is also the first one: victims must be ‘natural persons’,
a concept that is neither defined by either the Rome Statute nor its related
instruments (such as the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, or the Regulations
of the Court).
The ‘natural’ criterion distinguishes concrete beings from certain abstract
entities (e.g. institutions, artificial intelligence creations) and, in this sense,
‘animals, who are concrete beings, must be considered natural’.35 As to ‘per-
sonhood’, many may think this concept refers to the biological condition of
being a human being. However, personhood is ‘used to explain why one entity
(a person), has an enhanced moral status as compared with another (a non-
person)’.36 The central question then becomes: what is it in human beings that
justifies their higher moral status and, thus, their entitlement to personhood to
the exclusion of other natural entities?
Some schools of thought are grounded on the notion of human exception-
alism according to which there are certain characteristics peculiar to humans
that render them unique and worthy of personhood.37 The German Ethics
Council is an example of this trend as it regards ‘human’s capacity for lan-
guage and culture, self-awareness and capacity for moral reasoning and moral
behaviour as the basis of the special position (‘Sonderstellung’) of humans’.38
The problem is that human exceptionalism has been constantly disproven by
science. The use of language, ethical engagement, the capacity to solve social
problems, express emotions, develop a culture, and even have a sense of hu-
mour have been observed in several animal species.39 The reaction of human
exceptionalism to such puzzling scientific discoveries has been to raise the bar
of the personhood test accordingly.40 This is a short-sighted strategy as it
34 These are: the Office of Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), the Victims Participation and
Reparations Section (VPRS), the Victims and Witnesses Protection Section (VWS), and the
Trust Fund for Victims (TFV).
35 D. Chauvet, ‘Four Kinds of Nonhuman Animal Legal Personification’, 8 Global Journal of Animal
Law (2020) 1–22, at 4–5.
36 C. Foster and J. Herring, Identity, Personhood and the Law (Springer, 2017), at 22.
37 L. Palazzani, ‘Person and Human Being in Bioethics and Biolaw’, in V.A.J. Kurki and T.
Pietrzykowski (eds), Legal Personhood: Animals, Artificial Intelligence and the Unborn (Springer,
2017) 105–112, at 110.
38 A. Peters, Animals in International Law (Heidelberg, unpublished manuscript, 2019), at 336.
39 L. Gruen, Ethics and Animals: An Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2011), at 5–43. See
also S. Donaldson and W. Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford
University Press, 2011), at 26.
40 Donaldson and Kymlicka, ibid., at 24–27.
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entails excluding certain humans from the notion of persons such as ‘infants,
the senile, the mentally disabled’ etc.41 Given the ethically unacceptable con-
sequences of this line of reasoning, the school of human exceptionalism is now
naked to the criticism of institutionalizing speciesism.
Another personhood theory is based on the notion of social contract and
the capacity to be a right holder and a duty bearer. This seems to be the
understanding of the International Law Commission: ‘[I]n the legal sense
. . . a “person” is any being, object, association or institution which the law
endows with the capacity of acquiring rights and incurring duties. A legal
system may confer legal personality on whatever object or association it
pleases.’42
The social contract theory was used by the Supreme Court of New York to
deny personhood to Tommy,43 a chimpanzee kept alone inside a cage for
years. The social contract theory would lead to the scenario where certain
human beings, such as those mentally impaired or infants, would be denied
personhood — and, potentially, rights such as the right to life — on account of
their inability to be duty-bearers. It also denies personhood to animals such as
Tommy, who is condemned to continue alone and caged, since the law regards
him as a thing and thus no different from a table — a classification that,
according to the affidavit written by a group of renowned philosophers in
Tommy’s support, ‘is morally obscene’.44
A third school of thought is anchored on the idea that personhood should be
based on the possession of certain mental capabilities,45 regardless of ascription
to any particular species. It places emphasis on consciousness, cognition or
practical rationality. The proponents of this theory of personhood — including
Peter Singer — are amenable, and even favourable, to the idea of extending
the category of personhood to animals that exhibit such characteristics.
However, once again, this theory would seem to exclude some human beings
such as infants, juveniles and adults in vegetative states, or those with a severe
mental impairment.
This all goes to show that the notion of person before the law ‘is fraught
with deep ambiguity and significant tension’ that is ‘likely to become more
acute with technological and economic progress’46 — and, one may add, with
the animal turn movement. This explains the lack of ‘consistency and
41 Ibid., at 27.
42 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, Vol. II, Part Two, at 43, cited in Peters,
supra note 38, at 336.
43 Supreme Court of New York, People of the State of New York ex rel. the Non-Human Rights
Project, Inc., on behalf of Tommy v. Patrick C. Lavery, Individually and as an Officer of Circle L.
Trailer Sales, Inc., et al., 2014 WL 6802767 (4 December 2014).
44 K. Andrews et al., ‘Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers’ Brief’, available online at https://
philpapers.org/archive/ANDCRT-2.pdf (visited 9 March 2021).
45 Foster and Herring, supra note 36, at 23–25.
46 N. Naffine, ‘Who are Law’s Persons? From Cheshire cats to responsible subjects’, 66 The Modern
Law Review (2003) 346–367, at 346.
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uniformity among legal systems in the conferment of legal personality’.47 In
the absence of a clear reason of principle, therefore, the line drawn between
persons and non-persons would seem to remain a matter of choice.
B. The Choice of the International Criminal Court
The ICC has clearly espoused the human exceptionalism theory as shown by
the contextual, systemic interpretation and subsequent practice around the
notion of ‘person’. For example, when the preamble of the Rome Statute
mentions victims, it does so by making reference to ‘children, women and
men’.48 Other norms of the legal framework refer to persons as a shorthand
to indicate ‘human being’. Article 1 of the Statute claims that the Court ‘shall
have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious
crimes of international concern’; Article 26 refers to jurisdiction over ‘persons’,
and Rule 123 RPE relates to measures to ensure the presence of the ‘person’
concerned at the confirmation hearing.
Moreover, the ICC was not created in a vacuum, but rather is an offspring of
international humanitarian law (IHL) which treats animals just as ‘property’.49
Its human-centric approach is, perhaps, evident in its very name (i.e. humani-
tarian). For example, the Martens clause, in any of its original or subsequent
binding formulations, restricts its scope of application to human persons.50
That said, a change may be on its way since the International Law
Commission’s Draft Articles on the Protection of the Environment in relation to
armed conflicts extend the scope of the clause to the environment, a notion
that includes fauna.51 As things stand now, however, the practice of the ICC
indicates an exclusively human focus. The early jurisprudence of the ICC was
indeed unequivocal:
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘natural person’, as it appears in Rule 85 (a), is in French
‘[un] être humain tel qu’il est consideréré par le droit; la personne humaine prise comme
sujet de droit, par opposition à la personne morale’, or, in English, ‘a human being’.68 A
natural person is thus any person who is not a legal person.52
47 ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 42, at 43, cited in Peters, supra note 38,
at 336.
48 Preamble (second recital) ICCSt.
49 Art. 54(2) of Additional Protocol I refers to ‘livestock’ in the prohibition of attacks against
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population. For a comprehensive review of
the treatment of animals in IHL, see M. Roscini, ‘Animals and the Law of Armed Conflict’, 47
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2017) 35–67.
50 See e.g. Preamble, 1907 Hague Regulations; Preamble (fourth recital), Additional Protocol II.
51 Draft Art. 8bis, ‘Proposed Draft Principles [on the protection of the environment in armed
conflict’, Annex II to the Second report on protection of the environment in relation to armed
conflicts by Marja Lehto, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/728, 27 March 2019 (‘Second
Report of Special Rapporteur on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict’).
52 PRV of the Decision on the application for participation in the proceedings VPRS 1, VPRS 2,
VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC-01/
04-101-tEN-Corr), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 17 January 2006, § 80 (some footnotes omitted, em-
phasis added).
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Contrary to what this passage claims, its internal footnote 68 does not
support the notion that a natural person equals a ’human being’. It refers to
Black’s Law Dictionary which instead says: ‘[s]o far as legal theory is con-
cerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights
and duties. Any being that is capable is a person, whether a human being or
not.’53
Fundamentally flawed at its core or not, this interpretation has remained
unchallenged at the Court. One could counter-argue that there is room to exit
the exclusively anthropocentric approach, insofar as the Rome Statute includes
crimes against cultural property and the environment. However, even then,
the practice of the ICC has proven to be exclusively human-focused. In the Al
Mahdi case, the only one so far which might be said not to be directly focused
on crimes against human beings, the OTP made interventions that were un-
apologetically anthropocentric: ‘[attacks against buildings dedicated to religion
and historic monuments] destroy the roots of an entire people and profoundly
and irremediably affect its social practices and structures . . . [this] is precisely
why such acts constitute a crime under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome
Statute.’54
Moreover, the ICC Prosecutor went on to cast an exclusively anthropocen-
tric motivation over all crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court: ‘[T]he Rome
Statute prohibits and punishes the most reprehensible criminal acts: . . . These
crimes can be perpetrated in various forms, but they all have one common
denominator: They inflict irreparable damage to the human persons in his or her
body, mind, soul and identity.’55 Likewise, it is notable that the most widely
accepted route for the ICC to address environmental crimes — beyond the
relatively limited scope of article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute — also
depends upon an anthropocentric analysis.56
In sum, as things stand now, everything indicates that the ICC frame-
work was written with the assumption that persons equal human beings.
The next sections show that, notwithstanding animals’ inability to be
human beings, they can suffer harm as a result of crimes under the juris-
diction of the Court.
53 Ibid., footnote 68 (emphasis added).
54 Transcript of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-T-2-Red2-
ENG), 1 March 2016, at 13, lines 18–22 (emphasis added).
55 Ibid., at 12, lines 10–14 (emphasis added).
56 See e.g. E. T. Cusato, ‘Beyond Symbolism: Problems and Prospects with Prosecuting
Environmental Destruction before the ICC’, 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ)
(2017) 491, at 498–500, 505–507; L. Prosperi and J Terrosi, ‘Embracing the “Human
Factor”: is there new impetus at the ICC for conceiving and prioritizing intentional environ-
mental harms as crimes against humanity?’ 15 JICJ (2017) 509, especially 510 (‘although
existing international criminal law may remain essentially anthropocentric, it need not be
entirely blind at least to some of the consequences of environmental harms. Indeed, the time
is propitious to embrace the “human factor” in such harms, and to recognize the dependency of
humanity upon its environment’).







qab039/6356124 by guest on 01 Septem
ber 2021
5. The Second Requirement: Can Animals Suffer Harm
in the Sense of Rule 85(a) RPE?
An important feature of the ICC that fundamentally sets it apart from
human rights courts is that victims’ entitlement to partake in proceedings
and potentially benefit from reparations does not stem from the breach of a
human right, or any right for that matter, but from the sufferance of harm
alone.57 The concept of harm denotes any type of injury, damage or loss,
and is normally categorized into three types: physical, moral and material.58
Additionally, the ICC has recognized a fourth type of harm, namely, the
deprivation of a fundamental right ‘which could include, for example, the
loss of educational opportunities, or the loss of social status’.59 Since the
existence of harm, and not of rights, is the pre-condition to obtain repar-
ations, the question that ensues is: can animals suffer harm? And, if so,
what types?
A. Can Animals Suffer Physical Harm?
Rule 85(a) RPE refers to the suffering of harm, as opposed to the experience of
harm, thereby denoting some kind of subjective feeling. Thus, the law does not
seem to dissociate the notion of ‘pain’ from that of ‘harm’,60 probably because
it never had to. While the way one deals with pain changes in every individ-
ual,61 we know that the suffering of pain is a universal experience shared
across the human species. However, when animals come into play, the dis-
tinction between pain and harm becomes cardinal because their sentience is,
although decreasingly so,62 still said to be in doubt.
The question that may thus ensue is this: does the Rome framework require
the experience of pain for something to count as physical harm? The answer
appears to be in the negative. The International Association of the Study of
Pain defines pain as ‘[a]n unpleasant sensory and emotional experience asso-
ciated with, or resembling that associated with, actual or potential tissue
57 See e.g. Reparations Order, Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15-236), Trial Chamber VIII, 17 August
2017 (‘Al Mahdi Reparations Order’), § 42.
58 Lubanga First Appeal Judgment on Reparations, supra note 30, § 10.
59 See H. Dumont, ‘Requirements for Victim Participation’, in Tibori-Szábo and Hirst, supra note
25, 45–80, at 56. See also Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defence against
Trial Chamber I’s Decision on Victims’ Participation of 18 January 2008, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-
01/06-1432), Appeals Chamber, 11 July 2008, § 92.
60 B.A. Rich, ‘Pain and the Law’, in J. Corns (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain
(Routledge, 2017) 403–413, at 404.
61 See P. Wall, Pain: The Science of Suffering (Columbia University Press, 2002).
62 For example, since the adoption of the 2012 Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness where a
group of prominent scientists drafted and signed the declaration stating that a considerable
amount of animals, vertebrates and invertebrates, are conscious and thus, are sentient and able
to experience what happens to them. The Declaration is available online at http://fcmconfer
ence.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf (visited 9 March 2021).
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damage’.63 This implies that, while pain may follow from harm (e.g. tissue
damage), it is a separate phenomenon. For example, a person who has suffered
damage to the spinal cord and has become paralyzed will not feel pain if their
leg is stabbed, but would undoubtedly suffer physical harm.64
If the dissociation of pain from physical harm holds true, then harm must be
capable of independent and objective assessment. As such, and since animals
possess bodies, they may be liable to suffer physical harm, just as humans do,
in the form of lesions or wounds, such as mutilation, injuries from bullets,
starvation, mistreatment, burns and, ultimately, death.
B. Can Animals Suffer Moral Harm?
Suffering moral harm refers to ‘mental or emotional distress, including emo-
tions such as anxiety and fear’.65 The causes of suffering are manifold such as
being subject to aggressive behaviour, being a witness to it, or ‘loss of loved
ones’,66 particularly family members.
It is being increasingly proven that animals possess personalities,67 and that
such personalities are ‘remarkably similar to those found in our own species’.68
Certain animals have emotions and empathy.69 Thanatology research has
shown that several species (e.g. rats, primates, elephants, giraffes and ceta-
ceans) understand the death of their conspecifics and react by burying the
corpse,70 or by other complex behaviour such as staying near the deceased for
extended periods of time, repeatedly visiting the place where the death
occurred, or avoiding it altogether.71 Grief has been observed in geese, lion
63 See International Association for the Study of Pain, ‘IASP Announces Revised Definition of
Pain’, 16 July 2020, available online at https://www.iasp-pain.org/PublicationsNews/
NewsDetail.aspx?ItemNumber¼10475 (visited 9 March 2021).
64 S. Blackwell, Consciousness: An Introduction (2nd edn., Routledge, 2010), at 50, 168.
65 C. McCarthy, Reparations and Victim Support in the International Criminal Court (Cambridge
University Press, 2012), at 96. See also International Law Commission, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, available online
at https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (visited 9
March 2021) (‘ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility’), at 92.
66 ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, ibid., at 92.
67 F. De Waal, Are We Smart Enough to Know How Smart Animals Are? (W.W. Norton & Company,
2016), at 4.
68 T. Weinstein, J. Capitanio, and S. Gosling, ‘Personality in Animals’, in O.P. John, R.W. Robins,
and L.A Perwin (eds), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research (Guilford Press, 2008) 328–
348, at 344.
69 G.M. Burghardt, ‘Insights found in Century-Old Writings on Animal Behaviour and some
Cautions for Today’, 164 Animal Behaviour (2020) 241–249, at 242; M. Bekoff, The
Emotional Lives of Animals: A Leading Scientist Explores Animal Joy, Sorrow, and Empathy, and
Why They Matter (New World Library, 2007), at 4–5.
70 J. R. Anderson, ‘Responses to Death and Dying: Primates and other Mammals’, 61 Primates
(2020) 1–7, at 2; See also S.Z. Goldenberg and G. Wittemyer, ‘Elephant Behavior toward the
Dead: A Review and Insights from Field Observations’, 61 Primates (2020) 119–128.
71 J.R. Anderson, ‘Comparative Evolutionary Thanatology of Grief, with Special Reference to
Nonhuman Primates’, 18 Japanese Review of Cultural Anthropology (2017) 173–189, at 179–
180,







qab039/6356124 by guest on 01 Septem
ber 2021
mothers, dolphins, orphaned elephants, gorillas72 and chimpanzees, who
would occasionally even let themselves die.73 Moreover, studies suggest that
the notion of family membership is not only experienced by the animal who
fulfills the role of mother, daughter, sibling and the like, but a trait that can be
externally recognized by their social group.74
Research continues to accrue hinting at a complex inner world in animals,
even though this happens on a piecemeal basis and from a rather sceptical
scientific stance where the widespread working assumption is that animals lack
self-awareness. As a result, ‘[w]hat we observe is not nature in itself, but
nature exposed to our method of questioning’.75 Yet, by now there is ‘compel-
ling evidence that at least some animals likely feel a full range of emotions,
including fear, joy, happiness, shame, embarrassment, resentment, jealousy,
rage, anger, love, pleasure, compassion, respect, relief, disgust, sadness, despair,
and grief’.76
At least the last three types, when established to the requisite standard of
proof, are recognized forms of moral harm.77
C. Can Animals Suffer Material Harm?
Animals cannot own property in the legal sense of the word, but they can
effectively possess things. The question is therefore whether the ICC requires
actual ownership as a precondition to suffer material harm. The Katanga Trial
Chamber used terms such as ‘own’ and ‘belonging’78 to refer to the material
harm ensuing from the war crime of pillage. It may be that this vocabulary
was just a shorthand expression to refer to a de facto state of affairs, and not to
actual ‘ownership’ in the sense of formal legal title. This is consistent with the
fact that the ICC understands harm independently from the deprivation of
rights. It is also in line with the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights — where claims for reparations are otherwise grounded on
the breach of rights — where property may stand for the ‘use and enjoyment
of possessions’.79
Therefore, if animals were taken seriously as a category of victims, it could
be argued that their form of using and possessing land is legally relevant, even
in the absence of a formal title. This is because, when animals are divested of
72 M. Bekoff, ‘Animal Emotions: Exploring Passionate Natures’, 50 BioScience (2000) 861–870, at
866.
73 J. Goodall, Through a Window: My Thirty Years with the Chimpanzees of Gombe (Mariner Books,
1990), at 224–225.
74 Anderson (2017), supra note 71, at 180. See also Z. Goldsborough et al., ‘Do Chimpanzees (Pan
troglodytes) Console a Bereaved Mother?’ 61 Primates (2019) 93–102.
75 Heisenberg cited in De Waal, supra note 67, at 7.
76 Bekoff (2000), supra note 72, at 861.
77 McCarthy, supra note 65, at 116.
78 Katanga Reparations Order, supra note 8, §§ 85, 90.
79 IACtHR, Case of Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 1 July 2006, §
174. See also IACtHR, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits,
Reparations and Costs, 31 August 2001, § 151.
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their shelter or source of nourishment, they suffer similar consequences to
humans who have lost their land, houses and access to food. Moreover, given
that animals exclusively depend on their habitat or caregivers for their sur-
vival, being deprived of their means to live represents, in essence, an acute and
exceptional form of material harm.
D. Can Animals Suffer Fundamental Deprivation of Rights?
There is no international treaty granting rights to animals, not even a treaty
according them universal standards of welfare. At the domestic level, a stra-
tegic litigation movement initiated in the USA is attempting to have the fun-
damental right to liberty granted with respect to a series of animals (e.g. apes,
elephants and cetaceans) through habeas corpus writs. So far, the litigation has
been unsuccessful in the United States. Yet, in Colombia, in 2017, a judge first
granted the habeas corpus writ to a bear (Chucho) and ordered his transfer to a
habitat with ‘full and dignified conditions in semi-captivity’.80 The order was
quashed in 2020 by the Colombian Constitutional Court, on the grounds that
the fundamental right not to be unlawfully deprived of one’s own liberty was
meant for human beings.81 But in Argentina, a Court did grant — and actu-
ally enforced — the writ in relation to Cecilia, a chimpanzee that was declared
to be a non-human legal person and transferred to a sanctuary in Brazil.82 In
Pakistan, the Islamabad High Court ruled in April 2020 that, ‘[a]fter surveying
the jurisprudence developed in various jurisdictions it has become obvious that
there is consensus that an “animal” is not merely a “thing” or “property”.’83 It
held that ‘life’ is the premise of the existence of a right and that ‘like humans,
animals also have natural rights which ought to be recognized’.84
Despite these developments, the existence of animal rights remains contro-
versial, isolated and limited to cases heard before courts, as opposed to legis-
lative acts with a broader scope of application.85 For now, animals do not hold
fundamental rights in any international or otherwise recognized level that
would come close to meeting the requirements of Article 21(2) or (3) of the
80 República de Colombia — Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Civil “HC4806–2017
Radicación n 7001-22-13-000-2017-00468-02 (26 July 2017), available online at http://
static.iris.net.co/semana/upload/documents/radicado-n-17001-22-13-000-2017-00468-02.pdf
(visited 9 March 2021), at 34.
81 Corte Constitucional de Colombia, ‘Comunicado n 03: Expediente T-6.480.577 – Sentencia SU-
016/20’ (23 January 2020), available online at https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comu
nicados/Comunicado No. 03 del 23 de enero de 2020.pdf (visited 9 March 2021), at 2.
82 Cecilia Case, supra note 18, at 41.
83 Islamabad Wildlife Management Board Case, supra note 18, at 58.
84 Ibid., at 60. For a commentary on the judgment, see S. Stucki and T. Sparks, ‘The Elephant in
the (Court)Room: Interdependence of Human and Animal Rights in the Anthropocene’, EJIL:
Talk!, 9 June 2020, available online at https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-elephant-in-the-courtroom-
interdependence-of-human-and-animal-rights-in-the-anthropocene/ (visited 9 March 2021).
85 S. Stucki, ‘Towards a Theory of Legal Animal Rights: Simple and Fundamental Rights’, 40
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2020) 533–560, at 535.
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Rome Statute. As such, animals cannot yet be said to suffer legally cognizable
harm as a result of their denial.
6. Third Requirement: Causal Link with the Commission
of a Crime within the Jurisdiction of the Court
The third element of Rule 85(a) RPE requires the harm to be ‘a result of the
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court’. The causal
standard required involves the confluence of the ‘but/for’ and ‘proximate
cause’ tests.86 This means that, but for the crime, the harm would not have
occurred; and that the crime is sufficiently ‘closely connected’87 to the
harm so as to make it legally appropriate to deem it to be the cause of
such injury. The chain of causation would be broken when an event could
not have been reasonably foreseen by the person committing the initial
act.88
The following paragraphs illustrate those Rome Statute crimes which could
cause harm to animals, directly or indirectly, and evaluate whether these
instances could meet the causal link to the standard required. The examples
focus on crimes which clearly have the potential to affect animals. Even
though intended to be as comprehensive as possible, it remains illustrative to
the extent that other scenarios could undoubtedly arise in which Rome Statute
crimes lead to the suffering of animals.
A. War Crimes
For the present purpose, the extensive list of war crimes in the Rome Statute
can generally be divided into four categories: crimes against property, crimes
against specially protected objects, crimes concerning unlawful methods of
warfare, and crimes against persons (understood as human persons). Each
category poses a distinctive risk to animals.
1. Harm Arising to Animals from War Crimes Against Property
Under IHL, animals are regarded as ‘property’, so they fall under Article 23(g)
of the 1907 Hague Regulations according to which it is prohibited to ‘destroy
or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be impera-
tively demanded by the necessities of war’, and Article 28 according to which
‘[t]he pillage of a town or a place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited’.
Similar prohibitions are incorporated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions with
86 Lubanga Reparations Principles, supra note 30, § 59.
87 Decision on the Matter of the Transgenerational Harm Alleged by Some Applicants for
Reparations Remanded by the Appeals Chamber in its Judgment of 8 March 2018, Katanga
(ICC-01/04-01/07-3804-Red-tENG), Trial Chamber II, 19 July 2018, § 16
88 Ibid., § 17. See also Al Mahdi Reparations Order, supra note 57, § 44.
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regard to certain protected property, and civilian objects are also protected
from attack by the 1977 Additional Protocols.
These prohibitions have found ample application in the ICC list of war
crimes. For example, the wording of Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations is clearly reflected in Articles 8(2)(b)(xiii) and 8(2)(e)(xii) of the
Rome Statute, according to which ‘[d]estroying or seizing the enemy’s property
unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities
of war’ is a war crime in both international and non-international armed
conflicts. Other war crimes applicable to international armed conflict, derived
from this background in IHL, include the crime of ‘extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly’ (Article 8(2)(a)(iv)); ‘intentionally directing attacks
against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives’
(Article 8(2)(b)(ii)); ‘[a]ttacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns,
villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not mili-
tary objectives’ (Article 8(2)(b)(v)).
One practical example which encapsulates most of the elements of the
crimes against property, except that of pillage, is the bombarding of the
town of Guernica (Spain) in 1937, in the context of the Spanish Civil War.
The bombing, which led to a fire that lasted for days, destroyed 85% of the
town, killed more than 1600 persons and injured more than 800.89 Since the
collective psyche generally does not consider animals as victims of war, the
effect of the Guernica attack on animals was neither reported then, nor dis-
cussed nowadays. However, Picasso’s masterpiece Guernica — which notably
features a bull, a horse and a bird — serves as a poignant reminder of the fact
that animals were no less victimized by the indiscriminate attack.
Indeed, the immediate impact of the bombs likely caused the death of
stray, farmed and domesticated animals living in the town. Others may
have died or been injured as a result of the ensuing fire, particularly ani-
mals locked in their barns. The town of Guernica is also surrounded by
forests and is close to what is today a natural protected area, the Urdaibai
estuary, home to a vast array of migratory birds. It would seem plausible
that the devastation of the town of Guernica extended to its natural border
area, affecting the habitat these birds and other species use to subsist,
leading to their physical suffering in the best of cases, and to their death
in the worst. All of these effects would satisfy the but/for and proximate
case test: the immediate death of some animals happened as a direct result
of the impact of the bombing. The destruction of the infrastructure and
surrounding area which could have affected tied animals and the habitat
in which wild ones lived, took place as a result of the use of Luftwaffe
incendiary bombs. Therefore, in Operation Rügen, animals — qua civilian
89 E. Jara, ‘El Bombardeo de Guernica en 1937, la Masacre que Inspiró a Picasso’, Historia:
National Geographic, 22 June 2018, available online at https://historia.nationalgeographic.
com.es/a/bombardeo-guernica-1937-masacre-que-inspiro-a-picasso_12702/1 (visited 9 March
2021).
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property — were both among the ‘civilian objects’ that rendered this attack
a violation of IHL, and a constituency which suffered direct harm as a result
of it.
In contrast, in the case of the crime of pillage (Articles 8(2)(b)(xvi) and
8(2)(e)(v)), the type of harm that animals suffer — and the extent to which
they suffer it — is open to question and would depend on the circumstances.
In the Katanga case, nothing indicated that animals pillaged were subsequently
killed, and it rather seems that they were merely (re-)appropriated by a differ-
ent owner. For domesticated animals that were already owned by someone
(most likely as a food source), the change of ownership from one person to
another may not cause more harm to the animal than the one it is already
enduring being treated as an object. Therefore, in such cases of pillage, it
would be difficult to argue that animals suffer any type of relevant harm as
a result of the crime.
On the other hand, when the change of ownership clearly worsens the
animal’s circumstances, then there could be harm meeting the but/for and
proximate cause test. This would be the case in instances of poaching90 — at
least for the poaching of wild animals which can, nevertheless, be said to be
‘owned’ for the purpose of the Rome Statute. There, the harm caused to wild
animals would vary depending on whether the poaching entailed their removal
from their natural habitat or their killing. In the first case, the harm could be
physical if the living conditions lead the animal to its demise, and also moral if
that animal’s type can experience the harm for having been subtracted from its
environment and social group. In the second case, the harm to animals would
be their death and perhaps even the threat of extinction of species, which is a
type of collective harm with which no Court dealing with humans has yet had
to address, beyond even genocide.
2. Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Against Specially Protected Objects
Animals can suffer direct harm as a result of war crimes targeted at specially
protected objects, such as medical units and personnel, cultural property and
the environment. For example, the war crime of intentionally directing attacks
‘against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using
the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions’ (Articles 8(2)(b)(xiv),
8(2)(e)(ii)), and directing attacks against ‘personnel, installations, material,
units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping’ mis-
sion (Articles 8(2)(b)(iii), 8(2)(e)(iii)) may harm animals if they are used as
means of transport in medical or humanitarian convoys.
90 For example, elephants and rhinos are poached in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and
Central African Republic (CAR) by armed groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army and the
Janjaweed. See C. Haenlein, T. Maguire and K. Somerville, ‘Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and
Terrorism’, in C. Haenlein and M.L.R. Smith (eds), Poaching, Wildlife Trafficking and Security in
Africa: Myths and Realities, 86 Whitehall Papers (Royal United Services Institute, 2016), 58–76.
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Likewise, the war crime of ‘directing attacks against buildings dedicated to
religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments,
hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they
are not military objectives’ (arts. 8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv)) may harm animals
if the building serves as their shelter. This would be the case for cultural and/
or religious sites where animals are worshipped, such as the Karni Mata
Temple in India — perhaps known more widely as the Temple of Rats —
where around 25,000 black rats live and are revered. Although this war crime
specifically refers to ‘buildings’, a reading more in line with the concept of
‘cultural heritage’ should encompass ancestral lands that are home to different
animals’ species.91 ‘[B]uildings dedicated to . . . education . . . science’ could
also be interpreted as including zoos and sanctuaries in their own right since
they are built for such purposes. Nature reserves, to the extent that they can
be considered places dedicated to an educational and/or charitable purpose,
could also potentially fall within the scope of this war crime. This means that
zoos, sanctuaries and natural reserves could enjoy a distinct status in addition
to their status as civilian objects, making an attack against them a war crime
of its own.
Directing an attack against, say, a zoo, would cause the immediate death
and injury of different animals housed inside. It would also cause the decease,
injury or flight of their keepers, an eventuality that would expose zoo animals
to starvation and disease. In this example of a direct attack against the zoo, the
but/for and proximate standard test would be met. In contrast, and unfortu-
nately, zoo animals often die in this way when they are abandoned in the
midst of armed conflicts.92 However, this suffering is mostly due to the lack of
management and cannot be linked to an actual war crime, rendering their
harm invisible to Rule 85(a) RPE.
Moving on to the only war crime expressly concerned with the environment
(Article 8(2)(b)(iv)), it is important to note that, uniquely, this incorporates the
causation of damage as part of its elements: ‘Intentionally launching an attack
in the knowledge that such attack will cause . . . widespread, long-term and
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.’
This is a way of embedding the but/for and proximate test in its definition
given that animals (i.e. fauna) are part of the notion of environment.93
Damage to the environment of the kind and degree required by this war crime
91 See e.g. the concept of ‘cultural landscapes’ in the context of the Convention concerning the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.
92 This has been reported in Yemen, Syria and Libya, to name a few. See e.g. N. Daly, ‘War-Torn
Yemen is Letting its Zoo Animals Starve to Death’, National Geographic, 21 December 2016,
available online at https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/article/wildlife-watch-taiz-zoo-
animals-starving-leopard-war (visited 9 March 2021).
93 See International Law Commission, ‘Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind’, 43 Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1991), at 107, § 4; Second Report
of Special Rapporteur on Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict, supra note 51, §§
186–187.







qab039/6356124 by guest on 01 Septem
ber 2021
would necessarily lead to the demise of animals in terms of immediate death,
starvation, lack of shelter etc. However, the definition of this war crime
requires a very high threshold of harm (i.e. widespread, long-term, severe
and excessive) which, coupled with the fact that it only applies in international
armed conflicts, makes the application of this war crime a distant reality.
The latest version of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the
Protection of the Environment in Armed Conflict signals an incipient departure from
such stringent conditions. The Draft Articles do this in two major ways: first, by
stating that ‘no part of the natural environment may be attacked, unless it has
become a military objective’ (principle 13). This means that any such attacks may
be considered unlawful regardless of the degree of harm caused. Given that
‘animals’ are part of the environment, the Draft Articles could also function as
a watershed to prohibit the directing of attacks against animals as such, unless
they are military objectives. Second, the Draft Articles extend the scope of protec-
tion of the Martens Clause to the environment (principle 12):
In cases not covered by international agreements, the environment remains under the
protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.
While the direction and pace of international agreements concerning ani-
mals is uncertain and slow, the dictates of public conscience with respect to
the environment may be swiftly changing. This may offer some prospects of
enhanced protection in the not-too-distant future.
3. Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Involving Unlawful Methods of Warfare
The Rome Statute lists a number of war crimes derived from the prohibition of
using means and methods of warfare which are calculated to cause unneces-
sary suffering or superfluous injury.94 These include the war crime of employ-
ing ‘poison or poisoned weapons’ or ‘asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices’ (Articles 8(2)(b)(xvii) and
8(2)(e)(xiii), 8(2)(b)(xviii) and 8(2)(e)(xiv), respectively); and that of
employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature
to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate
. . . provided that such weapons . . . are included in an annex to this Statute . . ..95
The former war crimes would likely speak to the use of chemical weapons
such as Agent Orange that the United States utilized in South Vietnam. On
that occasion, the US Army intended to ‘eradicate the forest cover and food
supply of the NLF forces’96 with the but/for and proximate result that ‘the
94 ICRC, IHL Customary Law database, Rule 70, available online at https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/
customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule70 (visited 9 March 2021).
95 Art. 8(2)(b)(xx) ICCSt.
96 B. Leebaw, ‘Scorched Earth: Environmental War Crimes and International Justice’, 12
Perspectives on Politics (December 2014) 770–788, at 776.
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ground was littered with decaying jungle birds and paralyzed dying monkeys.
Clusters of dead fish shimmered like buttons on the surface of slow-moving
streams’.97
The rather long definition of Article 8(2)(b)(xx) — which applies to inter-
national armed conflicts only — is hobbled by the failure of ICC States Parties
to designate any weapons for inclusion in the required annex. Yet in theory
this crime could, for example, encompass the use of landmines. The devastat-
ing effect of these weapons on animals is already known. Landmines have
‘eradicated gazelles from parts of Libya, pushed snow leopard to the brink of
extinction in Afghanistan, and killed one of the few remaining male silver-
backed mountain gorillas in Rwanda’.98 The direct harm that animals suffer
from this is the same as humans, that is, death and physical injury in the form
of wounds and mutilation.
4. Harm Caused to Animals by War Crimes Against Human Persons
Finally, crimes against human persons may be ‘double-edged sword’ as far as
animals are concerned. On the one hand, domesticated animals suffer indir-
ectly when their carers are killed, injured or displaced, and become unable to
look after for them. On the other hand, it has been reported that some animals
thrive because ‘certain conservation opportunities do occur’99 in armed con-
flicts. What follows is a list of selected war crimes against humans with an
obvious detrimental effect on animals.
The war crime of starvation (art. 8(2)(b)(xxv)), which involves depriving the
civilian population of ‘objects indispensable to their survival’, may harm ani-
mals in three distinct ways. First, by making them liable to be killed as a
potential source of food in order to starve civilians, or as part of ‘scorched
earth’ strategies risking the starvation of civilians, a practice followed in World
War II. Second, by being starved due to the lack of resources to feed living
beings in general, akin to the events in the Yemen’s Taiz Zoo where 265
animals were left starving in December 2016, forming a broader context to
the starvation of the civilian population.100 Last, by becoming a source of food
when customarily they were not. For instance, in 2013, a Syrian imam issued
97 F.A. Wilcox, Scorched Earth: Legacies of Chemical Warfare in Vietnam (Seven Stories Press,
2011), at 1–2.
98 A. Gangwar, ‘Impact of War and Landmines on Environment’, paper presented at the con-
ference Landmines—Challenges to Humanity and Environment, organized by the Indian Institute
of Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection and Global Green Peace, 20 April 2003,
available online at http://lib.icimod.org/record/11218/files/1409.pdf (visited 9 March 2021),
at 2.
99 T. Hanson, ‘Biodiversity Conservation and Armed Conflict: A Warfare Ecology Perspective’,
1429 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences (2018) 50–65, at 50; T.R. Lookingbilland,
P.D. Smallwood, Collateral Values: The Natural Capital Created by Landscapes of War (Springer,
2019).
100 Daly, supra note 92.
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a fatwa allowing the starving local population to eat cats, dogs and donkeys101
— a practice which otherwise is forbidden by Islamic law.
The crimes of wilful killing and murder or directing attacks against the
civilian population (Articles 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(b)(i), 8(2)(c)(i) and 8(2)(e)(i)),
and causing the incidental injury or death of the civilian population in a
way that is clearly excessive to the concrete military advantage anticipated
(Article 8(2)(b)(iv)), are the archetypal violations of, respectively, the principles
of protection, distinction and proportionality. They would most certainly lead
to the indirect victimization of animals to the extent they are dependent on the
care of the direct victims, including death by starvation or disease of many
others as a sufficiently proximate cause.
The crime of forcibly displacing the civilian population from their homes or
communities is foreseen in Articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(e)(viii), albeit with differ-
ent wording, and is applicable in international and non-international armed con-
flicts, respectively. Essentially, they may be regarded as the same crime. There are
two imaginable ways in which animals can suffer indirect victimization as a
result. One, affecting domesticated and farmed animals, would consist in leaving
them behind, abandoned to roam the streets in the best of cases, or tied/caged in
the worst, unable to fend for themselves.102 Another could affect wild populations
of animals in a way similar to what happened in the context of the Rwandan
conflict. Refugees were relocated to the Virunga National Park, a world natural
heritage site located in the DRC. It was reported that there were human settle-
ments at walking distance from the park, and that ‘every day an estimated
30,000 adults and children forage[d] in the park with their machetes, emerging
with loads averaging 40 pounds’.103 Precisely because of the threats to the habitat
posed by refugees, the Park was inscribed on the List of World Heritage in Danger
in 1994,104 where it has remained ever since. That refugees would not only
occupy but also damage this national park was foreseeable as there had already
been warnings of this possibility.105
B. Crimes Against Humanity
Some of the underlying acts of crimes against humanity are similar to war
crimes. For example, murder and extermination (Articles 7(1)(a) and (b)),
101 S. Abedine, H. Gorani, and L. Smith-Park, ‘Syria: Reported Fatwa Allows the Hungry to Eat
Cats and Dogs’, CNN, 13 October 2013, available online at https://edition.cnn.com/2013/10/
16/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html (visited 9 March 2021).
102 P. Beirne and C. Kelly-Huber, ‘Animals and Forced Migration’, 49 Forced Migration Review
(2015) 97–98, at 97.
103 R. Bonner, ‘Flood of Rwandan Refugees is Destroying Ecological Treasure’, New York Times, 15
November 1994, available online at https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/15/science/flood-of-
rwanda-refugees-is-destroying-ecological-treasure.html (visited 9 March 2021).
104 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, ‘Inscription on the List of World Heritage in Danger:
Virunga National Park (Zaire)’, Decision CONF 003 IX, 12-17 December 1994.
105 UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, ‘Report of its 18th session’, WHC-94/CONF.003/16, 31
January 1995, at 21.
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causing the death of human persons, would have similar effects on animals as
described above in the context of war crimes. Therefore, this section only
addresses two crimes against humanity that could cause a distinctive form
of harm to animals: persecution and other inhumane acts.
1. Harm Caused to Animals through Persecution
The crime of persecution (Article 7(1)(g)) requires that the perpetrator severely
deprives the (human) victim of their fundamental rights in a discriminatory man-
ner by reason of religion, nationality, race, culture, ethnicity, gender or any other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international
law.106 Animals often play an understated but key role in the cultural and/or
religious identity of groups. For example, Hindus may regard cows as sacred,
Muslim and Jewish religions forbid the consumption of pork and mandate specific
rites and practices for killing animals which can be consumed, some Christians
obey a calendar which dictates what animals should be eaten, or not eaten, at
different times of the year; Western cultures consider eating cats and dogs un-
thinkable; and indigenous cultures may revere some native animals, and regard
their killing as offensive or sacrilegious. For this reason, attacking certain animals,
or forcing humans to consume certain animals, could potentially qualify as per-
secution if the act is considered to deprive the human person of their right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and to take part in their cultural
life,107 if performed with the requisite discriminatory intent.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) aptly
noted the cultural significance of animals in the Kupreskic case. Therein, it held
that the killing of animals from Muslim families was more than simply depriv-
ing the population from its property:
the house and livestock had for their owners not only economic value, but also and probably
even more importantly, emotional, psychological and cultural significance . . . [the livestock] in
addition to their economic value, took on a symbolic significance (for instance because Croats
had pigs and Muslims did not).108
The harm caused to animals in these instances is not a mere but/for conse-
quence and proximate cause of the crime of persecution, but a material element of
its modus operandi which entails their killing, sometimes done cruelly.109
2. Harm Caused to Animals through Other Inhumane Acts
‘Other inhumane acts’ (Article 7(1)(k)) need to be of similar character to any
of the other underlying acts of crimes against humanity, and to be carried out
106 Art. 7(1)(g) ICC Elements of Crimes, § 3.
107 See Art. 18 ICCPR; Art. 15(1)(a) ICESCR.
108 Judgment, Kupreskic, (IT-95-16-T), Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000 (‘Kupreskic Trial
Judgment’), § 336. See also Roscini, supra note 49, at 46.
109 Kupreskic Trial Judgment, ibid., § 210.
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‘intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health’.110 It could be imagined, for example, that intentionally
destroying the ancestral land constituting the cultural and spiritual heritage
of an indigenous group, and/or killing their sacred animals, could cause severe
mental suffering and be considered an inhumane act. Killing, torturing or
harming anyone’s animals could also lead to serious mental suffering of the
human person if s/he is deeply attached to the animal from a functional and/or
emotional point of view. This would be most obvious in persons with disabil-
ities who require the assistance of animal helpers, such as guide dogs, but it
could also be the case with standard persons who simply regard their com-
panion animals as family members.
Moreover, the very concept of ‘humanity’ — at the heart of ‘crimes against
humanity’ — may also bear some consideration. Such crimes may simply be
interpreted as crimes against large numbers of persons, or potentially so, which
therefore affect humanity itself by reason of their scale or highly organized
character. This is perhaps the initial and instinctive view, based on the require-
ments for such crimes to be part of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack. But,
alternatively, ‘humanity’ may also refer to the collective human consciousness
and its shared understanding of what is considered to exceed the boundaries of
acceptable behaviour, even when it is deviant (‘ordinary’ crimes). While of
course crimes against humanity require that the ‘civilian population’ is
attacked, as a matter of the lex lata, the deep offence to human values, which
we are particularly forced to consider when we explore the notion of ‘other
inhumane acts’,111 may lead us to consider how the law could or should one
day develop. For example, it might be regarded as no less reprehensible to
intentionally harm or destroy animals or species that are valued by humanity
as a whole, or at least a significant segment of it. For example, extermination
of animals considered vulnerable to extinction, such as pandas, silverback
mountain gorillas and the like. What is the damage to our humanity if we
kill those whom we should cherish?
C. Genocide
In particular, two of the underlying acts of genocide may cause indirect harm
to animals. ‘Killing members of the group’ (Article 6(a)) and ‘deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part’ (Article 6(c)). The former could lead to the
disease and/or death of domesticated and farmed animals, for the same reasons
explained above. The arrest warrant in Al Bashir112 is an example of the latter
case. The warrant includes the count of genocide on the basis of depriving the
population from accessing sources of water. According to the OTP, villagers
110 Art. 7(1)(k) ICCSt.; Art. 7(1)(k) ICC Elements of Crimes, § 2.
111 Peters, supra note 38, at 293.
112 Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (ICC-02/05-01/09-1), Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 4 March 2009.
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dug communal wells to ‘facilitate access to water by both human and ani-
mals’.113 These were ‘repeatedly destroyed, polluted or poisoned . . . so as to
deprive the villagers of water needed for survival’.114 That animals suffered
from the same deprivation of water as a direct result of the poisoning of wells
is a mere logical consequence of the criminal conduct specified.115
D. The Crime of Aggression
The ways in which the crime of aggression (Article 8bis) may be committed
are manifold but, with the exception of blockades, they essentially require
the use of force against the sovereignty, territory or political independence
of a State by another State,116 in the form of invasion, bombardment, at-
tack by armed forces, or acts of armed forces.117 In addition, for these acts
of aggression to meet the threshold of a crime under the Rome Statute, they
need to constitute a ‘manifest violation’ of the UN Charter by means of their
character, gravity and scale. This means that crimes of aggression would
tend to assume a large scale and, in turn, provoke extensive destruction. As
far as animals are concerned, if such attacks affect areas where they live or
that they use to sustain themselves, the harm they would endure would be
comparable to the one described above in war crimes against property, but
possibly in greater proportions.
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1990, which is a classic ex-
ample of the act of aggression, entailed the setting on fire of more than 700
oil wells. This led to environmental degradation of air and land quality,
terrestrial and marine habitats and biodiversity, in a way that ‘was imme-
diate, severe and long-lasting’.118 The UN Security Council found that Iraq
was ‘liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources’,119 and
established a commission for the purpose of reparations,120 which awarded
Kuwait considerable sums of money to remedy the ‘significant and
113 Summary of Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58, Situation in Darfur, Sudan (ICC-02/05-
152), Office of the Prosecutor, 14 July 2008 (‘Al Bashir AWA Summary’), § 31.
114 Ibid.
115 The Prosecution also alleged that animals were stolen in the attempt to destroy the group’s
means of survival: Al Bashir AWA Summary, supra note 113, § 14.
116 Art. 8bis ICC Elements of Crimes, § 3.
117 See Art. 8bis(2)(a)–(g) ICCSt.
118 L. Menhinick, ‘What the Environmental Legacy of-the Gulf War Should Teach Us’, Oxford
Research Group: Breaking the Cycle of Violence, 18 March 2016, available online at https://
www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/blog/what-the-environmental-legacy-of-the-gulf-war-should-
teach-us#:&:text¼More%20than%20700%20oil%20wells,km2%20of%20Kuwait’s%20deserts
(visited 9 March 2021).
119 SC Res. 687 (1991), § 16.
120 Ibid., § 9(b)(i). This commission would be known as the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC).
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widespread environmental damages, including loss of habitats and disturb-
ance to ecological equilibria’.121
In sum, this section has shown that animals can suffer direct and indirect
harm as a result of the commission of each core crime within the jurisdiction
of the ICC. Even with this limited review, it has documented how animals have
already suffered already harm as a result of the commission of core inter-
national crimes in the context of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Syria or
Sudan.
7. Extrinsic Impediments to the Recognition of Animals
as Victims
There are compelling reasons to consider animals as victims in the sense of
Rule 85(a) RPE, but for the legal obstacle — which is absolute, at least for
now — that they are not human beings. However, there are also extrinsic
considerations of a legal and political nature that suggest it would be prema-
ture to recognize animals as victims without careful thought and, ultimately,
deliberate amendment to the Court’s legal texts by the Assembly of States
Parties.
At the present time, extending the scope of ‘natural persons’ to include
animals, as a mere act of judicial interpretation, would have profound and
potentially ludicrous consequences for the functioning of the Court. Myriad
articles of the Statute, as well as other rules in the Court’s legal framework,
use the term ‘person’ as a shorthand for human being. Perhaps most notably,
Article 25 on ‘individual criminal responsibility’ states that the Court shall
have jurisdiction over ‘natural persons’. If it was accepted that the term ‘nat-
ural persons’ includes animals in order to extend the protection of the law over
them, then it would seem — absurdly — that they might also be subject to
criminal trial?122 Similarly, the term ‘persons’ is omnipresent in the Statute’s
definition of crimes. If persons were to include animals, without further quali-
fication, it would lead to the no less absurd scenario where the killing of
animals during wartime would be criminalized as murder, and could poten-
tially amount to a crime against humanity in peacetime. For all these reasons,
notwithstanding the strong arguments in principle for animals to be considered
‘natural persons’ within Rule 85(a) RPE, this is best achieved by an amend-
ment to the legal framework. Among other benefits, this would create a dis-
tinction between the concept of ‘natural persons’ in the context of victims, and
121 UNCC, ‘Follow-up Programme for Environmental Awards: State of Kuwait’, available online at
https://uncc.ch/state-kuwait (visited 9 March 2021) (offering an overview of the damages
paid in relation to the environment and the purpose of the environmental programmes).
122 This is not without historical precedent. See e.g. M. Simon, ‘Fantastically Wrong: Europe’s
Insane History of Putting Animals on Trial and Executing them’, Wired, 24 September 2014,
available online at https://www.wired.com/2014/09/fantastically-wrong-europes-insane-his
tory-putting-animals-trial-executing/ (visited 9 March 2021).
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the concept of ‘natural persons’ for the purposes of investigation and prosecu-
tion, and for the definition of crimes.
Outside these strictly legal arguments, other factors also indicate that treat-
ing animals as victims within the scope of Rule 85(a) RPE should be the result
of a conscious, deliberative process. In particular, affording such privileged
treatment to animals would most certainly be perceived by some as trivializing
human suffering, and potentially an affront to those victims that fall outside
the scope of situations and cases. It would be incomprehensible in some cul-
tures and areas where the ICC operates, where animals are more traditionally
seen as objects. And it might be instrumentalized by States which are vocal in
expressing their opposition to the Court,123 in order to attack, undermine and
ridicule the Rome Statute. In short, and sadly, it is not enough that animals
might with some degree of plausibility be argued to be capable of victimhood of
international crimes. Reform in this area cannot come until the international
community more broadly is ready to treat the idea with the seriousness it
deserves.
8. Conclusion
The somehow outlandish question guiding this article has sought to put the
spotlight on the fact that animals are sentient and suffer harm as a result of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. It has furthermore shown that ani-
mals are already repeatedly brought into reparations schemes. The complete
silence of the ICC’s legal framework with regards to animals is therefore bound
to become more uncomfortable the longer it is maintained. Relevant changes
in international and domestic legal thinking on the position of animals may be
limited, but they are neither isolated nor anecdotal: they announce a marked
departure from the established status quo.
If animals were ever to be admitted as victims at the ICC, they would ac-
quire the right to participate (through legal representatives) in proceedings
when their interests are affected (Articles 68(3)). In practical terms, this could
mean that application forms for participation and/or reparations would be filled
by a human being or organization acting on their behalf, similar to the prac-
tice when a human victim is a minor or someone with impaired capacities. It
would be for the Trial Chamber at hand to decide whether animal victims
should be represented by the same lawyer(s) appointed for the human victims
of the case. The victim animals’ lawyer would be in charge of conveying, for
example, that their habitats had been destroyed, their ecosystem disrupted, the
extent of misery endured by farmed and city animals, and so on. For this
purpose, the use of experts (e.g. ethologists, zoologists, marine biologists, vet-
erinarians) would be appropriate to conduct scoping studies on harm.
123 See e.g. ‘International Criminal Court officials sanctioned by US’, BBC News, 2 September
2020, available online at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54003527 (visited 9
March 2021).
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Victim animals would also be entitled to receive reparations (Article 75).
The Court could avail itself of thematic advisers through the usual recruitment
channels, amici curiae, and/or appoint experts in the reparations phase pursu-
ant to Rule 97(2) of the RPE in order to determine reparations for the benefit
of animals. One could imagine that these could lead to collective rehabilitation
programmes in the form of reforestation, the construction of animal shelters
and sanctuaries, the provision of veterinary services, or the awarding of resour-
ces to zoos and natural reserves affected by the crimes. However, as far as Rule
85(a) RPE goes, it is admitted that this is a rather distant scenario.
The reduction of animals to objects at the ICC may lead to practical com-
plications along the way. Making use of animals in reparations proceedings, in
the absence of welfare standards, could expose the Court to instances of animal
mistreatment. In the context of freezing property and assets belonging to the
accused,124 the lack of a regulatory framework regarding the treatment of
animals could become a problem if the Court realizes that the accused in
question owns animal derivatives, such as tusks and rhino horns, or live
animals. This scenario could very well be the case for someone like Joseph
Kony, given the LRA’s involvement in poaching,125 or even Saif al-Islam
Gaddafi, who was known for having a private zoo containing lions, ostriches
and camels.126
All of this reinforces the need to address the animal question at the ICC, and
sooner rather than later. It is frankly acknowledged that, for many, equating
animals to victims may be stretching the boundaries of this legal notion. But,
at our present stage of scientific discovery, so too is the default assumption that
we must keep them in the same category as tables.
124 Art. 57(3)(e) ICCSt.
125 See e.g. Warrant of arrest for Joseph Kony issued on 8 July 2005 as amended on 27
September 2005, Kony and Otti (ICC-02/04-01/05-53), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 27 September
2005; Haenlein, Maguire and Somerville, supra note 90, at 71–74.
126 See e.g. Decision on the ‘Prosecutor’s Application Pursuant to Article 58 as to Muammar
Mohammed Abu Minyar GADDAFI, Saif Al-Islam GADDAFI and Abdullah AL-SENUSSI’,
Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (ICC-01/11-01/11-1), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 27 June
2011. See also L. Harding, ‘Gaddafi’s Son Abandons his Lions in Fight for Tripoli’, The
Guardian, 30 August 2011, available online at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
aug/30/gaddafi-son-abandons-lions-tripoli (visited 9 March 2021).
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